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Penalizing and Chilling an Indigent's
Exercise of the Right to Appointed
Counsel for Misdemeanors
Russell L. Christopher'
ABSTRACT: While Gideon v. Wainwright is widely andjustly celebrated
for extending the right to the appointment of counsel to all indigent
defendants charged with felonies, Gideon's application to misdemeanors is
less well-known and more limited. In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
restricted Gideon to misdemeanants actually sentenced to imprisonment.
That is, the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard declines to extend
Gideon to indigents with trial outcomes of either acquittal or conviction
with a non-imprisonment sentence. Because only a post-trial outcome
governs whether the Gideon right to counsel applies prior to and during
trial, the "actual imprisonment" standard illogically places the cart before
the horse. Despite strong criticism from both judges and commentators, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to fully extend Gideon. Overlooked
amidst the more obvious and glaringdeficiencies is perhaps a more powerful
argument against Scott's "actual imprisonment" standard: It forces an
indigent to choose between the assistance of appointed counsel (but at the
price of eligibility for the harsher punishment of imprisonment) versus
avoiding eligibilityfor harsherpunishment (but at the price of lacking the
assistance of counsel). Because an indigent may eliminate the prospect of
harsher punishment by not exercising the right to appointed counsel, this
Essay advances the novel claim that Scott's "actual imprisonment"
standard may unconstitutionallypenalize and chill an indigent's exercise of
the right to counsel.

*
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INTRODUCTION

Gideon v. Wainwight is widely celebrated for extending the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel to all indigent state defendants
charged with a felony.' "As the right that ensures that 'all other rights of the
accused are protected,'"2 Gideon's importance cannot be overstated. But
perhaps less well-known and certainly much less celebrated is the limited
scope of Gideon's application to misdemeanors. Because of "[t]he recent
exponential growth in [misdemeanor] prosecutions" which led one
commentator to declare that "[t]here is a misdemeanor crisis in the United
States,"s and because "the world of misdemeanors looks to be about four or
five times the size of the world of felonies,"4 the limited scope of Gideon's
application to misdemeanors may be more important than Gideon itself.
As applied to indigents charged with a misdemeanor, the Supreme
Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin limited the scope of the Gideon right against
deprivations of liberty.5 Those charged with misdemeanors in which
imprisonment is not an authorized punishment do not enjoy the
constitutional right to appointed counsel. And the scope of Gideon's
application to misdemeanors is even more limited. In Scott v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court clarified that even those charged with misdemeanors in
which imprisonment is an authorized punishment are not necessarily
constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.6 Only indigents charged with
a misdemeanor in which both imprisonment is authorized and actually
imposed enjoy the Gideon right to appointed counsel.7
While Gideon's application to misdemeanors has been criticized from all
directions, much of the debate has centered on the preferability of an
"authorized imprisonment" standard over an "actual imprisonment"
standard. If Gideon's application to misdemeanors is to be limited at all, the
Gideon right should be limited to indigents charged with a misdemeanor in
which imprisonment is authorized (the "authorized imprisonment"
standard). But by limiting Gideon's application to misdemeanors to indigent
defendants actually receiving imprisonment (the "actual imprisonment"

1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). As testament to Gideon's enduring legacy,
see, for example, the three recent symposiums celebrating the 5 oth anniversary of the decision:
Symposium, Fifty Years of Gideon: The Past, Present, and Future of the Right to Counsel, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1875 (2014); Symposium, Gideon at 5o: Reassessing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 835 (2013); Symposium, The Gideon Effect: Rights, justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013).
2.
Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2013)
(quoting Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988)).

5.

Jenny Roberts, Crashingthe MisdemeanorSystem, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 108g,1090 (2013).
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 8 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320-21 (2012).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).

6.

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).

7.

See id.

3.
4.
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standard), the Supreme Court has established a standard that is often
criticized as illogical in principle and unworkable in practice.8 In order to
determine whether a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, a judge
must determine, prior to the verdict and before even hearing the evidence,
whether she will impose a sentence of imprisonment. This puts the cart of
punishment before the horses of trial, evidence, and guilt.9 But, despite
significant criticism from judges and commentators alike, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has refused to extend Gideon's application to
misdemeanors any more broadly. The glaring and obvious problems of the
"actual imprisonment" standard have perhaps obscured what may be an
even more powerful argument against it. Overlooked is that Scott's "actual
imprisonment" standard may unconstitutionally penalize and chill an
indigent's enjoyment of the right to appointed counsel.
After briefly tracing the Supreme Court's path to Gideon and the Court's
limited application of Gideon to misdemeanors, Part I canvasses the debate
among judges and commentators of the Scott "actual imprisonment"
standard. It presents criticisms that the standard is too narrow, too broad,
and, depending on the case, either too narrow or too broad.
Part II presents a different type of criticism of Scott. It raises the novel
argument that the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard
may
unconstitutionally penalize and chill an indigent's exercise of the right to
appointed counsel. The argument relies on the general principle of
constitutional law that chilling or penalizing the exercise of a constitutional
or even statutory right is itself unconstitutional. Attaching the prospect of
greater punishment (imprisonment) as the price to be paid for enjoying the
assistance of appointed counsel penalizes and chills the exercise of that
right. Because an indigent can avoid the prospect of greater punishment by
refraining from exercising the right to appointed counsel, the Scott "actual
imprisonment" standard coerces an indigent from seeking the assistance of
appointed counsel.
After Part III anticipates and attempts to rebut three possible
objections, this Essay concludes that the Scott "actual imprisonment"
standard penalizes and chills an indigent defendant's exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of appointed counsel. Although not
entirely clear, Scott's coercive effect on the right to counsel is plausibly
unconstitutional. If Gideon is not to apply to all indigents charged with
misdemeanors, then the basis of any limitation should be the "authorized

8. See, e.g., Adam D. Young, Comment, An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
as It Applies to Suspended Sentences and Probation:Do Argersinger and Scott Blow a Flat Note on
Gideon's Trumpet?, 107 DIcK. L. REv. 699, 707 (2003) ("In application, however, the 'actual
imprisonment' standard has often proved illogical to the point of nullity given the workings of
the American criminal justice system.").
9. JAMESJ. ToMKovIcz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 6o (2002).
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imprisonment" standard. In addition to avoiding the numerous problems
besetting the "actual imprisonment" standard noted by judges and
commentators,
the
"authorized
imprisonment"
standard
avoids
unconstitutionally burdening the right to appointed counsel.
I.

APPLYING GIDEONTO MISDEMEANORS

After briefly sketching the evolution of the Supreme Court's approach
to the right of appointed counsel and its path to Gideon, this Part traces
Gideon's application to misdemeanors. It then presents the numerous
criticisms that application has attracted: The scope of Gideon's application to
misdemeanors is too narrow, too broad, and, depending on the case, either
too narrow or too broad.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OFINDIGENTS'RIGHT TOAPPoINTED COUNSEL

The literal language of the Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part,
only that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right to . . . have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence."o It says nothing about a right to
appointed counsel at state expense and most scholars believe that it was not
originally intended to supply such a right." But "[t]he right to counsel
has ... been an evolving concept."" In 1932, the Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama recognized for the first time that the right to counsel includes the
right to appointed counsel at state expense for indigents, unable to
adequately defend themselves, charged with capital offenses.'s Six years later
in 1938, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst extended the Powell right to
appointment of counsel for indigents charged in federal court with either
capital or non-capital offenses.4
It was not until 1963, in Gideon, that the Supreme Court again extended
the right to the appointment of counsel to all indigents charged with a
felony.'s In broad and sweeping language, the Court proclaimed that "any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."' 6 In 1972, in Argersinger, the
Court explicitly affirmed that Gideon's "any person" standard for the right to
appointed counsel included indigents charged with misdemeanors who
received a sentence of imprisonment.7 The Court held that "absent a

10.

U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.

11.

E.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 9, at 55; Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court
Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 142, 162 (2009).
12.

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

13.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,69 (1932).

14.

16.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Id. (emphasis added).

17.

See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.

15.
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knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."' 8 Because the
defendant actually was sentenced to imprsonment,9 Argersingerarguably left
open the issue of whether an indigent charged with a misdemeanor in which
imprisonment was authorized, but not necessarily imposed, also had a right
to appointed counsel.20 Most commentators and courts presumed that the
Court would continue the expansion and evolution of the right to appointed
counsel by extending the right to indigents charged with misdemeanors in
which imprisonment was merely authorized (but not actually imposed).-But in 1979, the Scott Court surprised and disappointed many by foreclosing
that evolution.2 Finding that Argersingerwas not "a point in a moving line" of
ever-expanding rights to appointed counsel,2s Scott ruled "that Argersingerdid
indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel" to those
receiving actual imprisonment.24
Rather than reconsidering the scope of the right to counsel under Scott,
"the Court appears firmly committed to utilizing the actual imprisonment
standard as the sole Sixth Amendment dividing line for requiring appointed
counsel in misdemeanor cases."25 The Court has focused on construing what

sentences of punishment constitute actual imprisonment sufficient to trigger
a right to appointed counsel.2 6 In Nichols v. United States, the Court ruled that
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in which no imprisonment was
imposed (thus valid under Scott) could be used to enhance the punishment
level of a subsequently committed offense.27 Thus, the increased term of
imprisonment for the subsequent offense did not constitute actual
imprisonment under Scott for the previous offense. However, in Alabama v.
Shelton, the Court distinguished Nichols and held that a suspended sentence
for an uncounseled misdemeanant, conditioned on satisfying terms of
probation, did constitute actual imprisonment under Scott.g8

I8.
ig.

Id. at 37.

Id. at 26.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 379 (1979) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond "Life and Liberty": The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARv.
21.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (2013) ("After Argersinger, many thought it was only a matter of time
before the Court explicitly declared a right to appointed counsel in all criminal cases.").
See, e.g., id. at 15 (lamenting that "the decision in Scott essentially froze the evolution of
22.
the right to appointed counsel").
Scott, 440 U.S. at 369.
23.
20.

24.

Id.at373.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 595 ( 5 th ed. 2009).
26.
2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
ADJUDICATION 53 (4 th ed. 2006) (citing Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002)).
25.

27.
28.

Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 738 (1994).
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 672.
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CRITICIsMS OFGIDEON'sAPPLICATION TO MISDEMEANORS-THE "ACTUAL
IMPRISONMNT" STANDARD

The Scott "actual imprisonment" standard has been heavily criticized.
This Part presents arguments that the scope of the right to counsel under
this standard is too narrow, too broad, and, depending on the particular
case, either too narrow or too broad.
1.

"Actual Imprisonment" Standard: Too Narrow

There are six principal criticisms of the "actual imprisonment" standard
from those arguing that the standard should be broadened to provide all, or
greater numbers of, indigent misdemeanants with appointed counsel. First,
the literal text and plain meaning of both the Sixth Amendment and Gideon
establish that all indigent defendants should have the right to appointed
counsel.29 Second, an indigent must have the right to counsel at least
whenever there is a right to a jury trial.so Third, the "actual imprisonment"
standard precludes the appointment of counsel in cases where the collateral
consequences of a conviction may be as, or more, serious than
imprisonment.s' Fourth, the standard for appointment of counsel should be
a function of factual/legal complexity, where need for counsel is greatest,
rather than being based upon the grade of offense or type of punishment
imposed.ss Fifth, the fairness of a trial is not a function of the type of
punishment-imprisonment or not-that the defendant receives.ss Sixth,
the actual imprisonment standard "puts the cart before the horse."34 It
requires trial judges to decide the type of punishment they will impose
before determining guilt, before considering all of the evidence, and before
the trial even starts.35

29.

See, e.g., Scott, 44o U.S. at 375-79 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Marcus, supra note

i1, at

189.

30. See, e.g., Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 378-82, 389
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 45-46 (Powell, J., concurring);
Case Notes, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 6o, 86 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 383 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring); B. Mitchell Simpson, III, A Fair
Trial: Are Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMs U. L. REV. 417, 437-38 (2000).
See, e.g., Argersinge, 407 U.S. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring); LAWRENCE HERMAN, THE
32.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 84 (1973).

33.

See, e.g., Argersinger,407 U.S. at 47, 52 (Powell,J., concurring); Simpson, supra note 31,

at 424, 43734.

TOMKOVICZ, supra note 9, at 6o.

35. Simpson, supra note 3 1, at 435 ("The chief practical problem ... of the Scott rule [is that
it] . . . . binds a judge before all of the evidence has been presented .. . The determination of a
sentence should follow a trial, not precede it."). For discussion of administrative and constitutional

problems this reverse ordering creates, see Scott, 44o U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at
383-84 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Argersinger 407 U.S. at 52-55 (PowellJ., concurring).
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"Actual Imprisonment" Standard: Too Broad

Though perhaps no commentator argues that the "actual
imprisonment" standard is too broad, Erica Hashimoto comes close.3 6 Citing
the enormous caseloads of appointed defense counsel caused in part by the
Supreme Court's expansion of the right to counsel for misdemeanors,
Hashimoto argues that states should attempt to minimize an indigent
misdemeanant's eligibility for a right to counsel.37 By channeling scarce
appointed defense counsel resources into fewer but more deserving and
serious cases, the quality of representation would be improved.38
3.

"Actual Imprisonment" Standard: Either Too Narrow or Too Broad

Justice Powell argues that the preferable standard would be flexible and
provide a right to counsel "whenever the assistance of counsel is necessary to
assure a fair trial."39 The "actual imprisonment" standard is too narrow by
denying appointed counsel in cases where the collateral consequences of
conviction may be more serious than imprisonment.4o The standard is also
too broad because to preserve the option of imprisonment, a trial judge
must appoint counsel before the prosecution presents the relevant evidence
as to whether imprisonment is even warranted. Therefore, counsel will often
be appointed when unnecessary and will overburden the criminal justice
system.4'
II. UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BURDENING AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANORS

This Part advances a different type of argument against the Scott "actual
imprisonment" standard from those canvassed above. The "actual
imprisonment" standard chills and penalizes a defendant's exercise of the
right to appointed counsel. Whether this burdening of the right to counsel
is unconstitutional depends on the test that a particular court might employ.
After surveying a variety of such tests, Part II argues that the "actual

36.

See EricaJ. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.

461, 464-67 (2007).
37. Id. at 464-67.
38. Id. at 473-75.
39. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 47, 49 (Powell,J., concurring).
40. See, e.g., Scott, 44o U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring); Argersinger 407 U.S. at 48
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Stigma may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade. Losing one's driver's license is more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in
jail." (footnote omitted)); accord Marcus, supra note i1, at 173 ("[T]he collateral consequences
of such [misdemeanor] convictions can also lead to serious repercussions, often outweighing

the severity of the crime and the formal criminal punishment imposed at the original
sentencing.").

Marcus

cites four such consequences:

lost opportunities in employment,

education, housing, and U.S. residency for non-citizens. Id. at
Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell,J., concurring).
41.

173-87.
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imprisonment" standard's penalizing and chilling of the right to counsel is
plausibly unconstitutional.
A.

PENALIZING AND CHILLING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The "actual imprisonment" standard of Scott penalizes an indigent
defendant for enjoying her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
standard coerces or discourages an indigent from requesting the assistance
of counsel. It does this by establishing a sentencing differential between
those who enjoy the assistance of counsel and those who do not. A
counseled indigent is eligible for the presumptively greater type of
punishment of imprisonment. An uncounseled indigent may avoid eligibility
for a sentence of imprisonment. The only way for an indigent defendant to
ensure avoidance of eligibility for the greater type of punishment, if
convicted, is to not have the assistance of counsel. As a result, the "actual
imprisonment" standard that entails this sentencing differential
disincentivizes, discourages, coerces, or penalizes an indigent from
requesting, or invoking the right to, the assistance of counsel.
One might object that if a defendant may escape eligibility for greater
punishment by not requesting counsel, then being uncounseled only
benefits the defendant and benefitting the defendant is surely not
problematic. There are two responses to this objection. First, being
uncounseled is not an unalloyed benefit. That an uncounseled defendant is
disadvantaged is, as Gideon maintains, "an obvious truth."42 Being
uncounseled surely increases the probability of conviction; being counseled
surely increases the probability of an acquittal.43 The "actual imprisonment"
standard places the indigent in the following coercive dilemma: request
counsel to minimize the probability of conviction but at the cost of
potentially greater punishment, versus refrain from requesting counsel to
ensure lesser punishment but at the cost of increasing the probability of
conviction. Second, even if being uncounseled is an unalloyed benefit, the
next section demonstrates that whether a defendant benefits from her rights
being burdened may be irrelevant to its constitutionality.

42.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[Any person haled into court,

who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.").
See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment
43.
Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants FacingDeportation, 33 CARDozO L. REV. 585, 596-97
(201 1) ("[W]ithout counsel, innocent defendants are at greater risk of wrongful conviction. ...
Indeed, there is an even greaterrisk with respect to misdemeanors than more serious crimes.");
see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 9, at 128 (noting that absent counsel, "it is quite unlikely that an
accused will be able to enjoy the advantages of the other enumerated rights"). But see
Hashimoto, supra note 36, at 489-96.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-BURDENING

A general principle of constitutional law is that burdening a defendant's
invocation or enjoyment of a constitutional or statutory right is itself
unconstitutional.44 This general principle may be stated even more broadly:
Not only is conduct that is affirmatively protected by a statutory or
constitutional right not constitutionally subject to penalty or burden, but so
also is conduct that is merely allowed or not prohibited.45 More specifically,
"a sentencing court cannot consider against a defendant any constitutionally
protected conduct."4 6 Or, as another court put it, "whether a defendant
exercises his constitutional right ... must have no bearing on the sentence
imposed."47 Making the prospect of harsher punishment (imprisonment)
the price to pay for receiving appointed counsel seems to violate this general
principle. Further, by conditioning eligibility for imprisonment on
appointment of counsel, a judge would be impermissibly considering
appointment of counsel against the defendant, and appointment of counsel
would impermissibly affect the sentence imposed.
But this general principle is not absolute. As the Supreme Court
stresses, "not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not
every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid."48 Courts
and commentators, however, have struggled to articulate a coherent
rationale that readily explains under what conditions and circumstances
such burdens are constitutional and when they are unconstitutional.49

&

44. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("To punish a person
because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most
basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to
penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional."' (citation
omitted)); Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("There are rights of constitutional
stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price."); Howard E.
Abrams, Systemic Coercion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the Criminal Law, 72 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 128, 132 (1981) ("Any attempt to elicit a waiver of these fundamental rights by
punishing those who assert them is antithetical to the premises of our criminal justice system.").
45. See, e.g., United States v. Falcon, 347 F-3 d looo, 1004 ( 7 th Cir. 2003) ("A prosecution
is vindictive and a violation of due process if undertaken to punish a person because he has
done what the law plainly allowed him to do." (quoting United States v. Bullis, 77 F.3 d 1553,
1558 ( 7 th Cir. 1996))); see also Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363.
46. United States v. Watt, go F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990).
47. Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1974).
48. Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
49. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 44, at 132 ("To date, the Court has not formulated or
consistently applied a coherent theory . . . . This inability . . . has left the lower courts to

reconcile inconsistent holdings and produced myriad rationales and resolutions); Case Notes,
supra note 30, at 81 (remarking on "the impossibility of . . . drawing lines distinguishing
permissible and impermissible incentives to plead guilty on a reasoned basis"); Jason Mazzone,
The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 8oi, 8ol (2003) ("There is a paradox in constitutional
law, revealed by a simple question: Can individuals give up constitutional rights in exchange for
a benefit from the government? The answer is that it depends. . . ."); id. at 803 ("[O]ur answer
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Because of the lack of clarity in this general area, the apparent lack of
authority as to burdening the specific right to appointed counsel, and space
limitations, the aim of this Essay is modest. It is merely to make plausible the
claim that Scott's "actual imprisonment" standard unconstitutionally
penalizes and chills the exercise of the right to counsel.
Two clear areas where penalizing a constitutional right have been
upheld to be constitutional are guilty pleas and plea bargains.5o Guilty pleas
and plea bargains similarly entail a sentencing (and/or charging)
differential that might be said to penalize or coerce a defendant from
invoking her Sixth Amendment right to a trial. The prospect of greater
punishment arguably penalizes a defendant exercising the right to trial.51
The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly rejected the argument that the
sentencing differential plea bargains entail unconstitutionally penalizes or
burdens a defendant's constitutional right to trial.52
The sentencing differential entailed by the Scott "actual imprisonment"
standard, however, does not fall within this plea bargaining exception to the
general rule for a number of reasons. First, while the sentencing differential
of plea bargains is created by the prosecutor, the sentencing differential of
the "actual imprisonment" standard is judicially or legislatively created.
Underpinning the Supreme Court's endorsement of plea bargains is the
"mutuality of advantage"5s stemming from the "'give-and-take' of ...
bargaining"s4 between an individual defendant and prosecutor. In contrast,
the give-and-take bargaining giving rise to mutuality of advantage is lacking
between an individual defendant and the distant court or legislature
creating the "actual imprisonment" standard.55 Second, the "actual
to the question of whether individuals can exchange constitutional rights for government
benefits remains quite arbitrary.").

5o. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ("[It is well settled that
plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution even though a guilty plea waives important
constitutional rights."); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("[Plea bargains are]
not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part. . . .").
51.

See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S.

196,

210 (1995)

("[C]onfronting a

defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a discouraging effect on
the defendant's assertion of his trial rights ..... (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See, e.g., id. ("[W]e have repeatedly held that the government 'may encourage a guilty
plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.'" (quoting Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 219)).
53. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); accord Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363
("Plea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each
with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial."). For an account of these mutual advantages,

see Brady, 397 U.S. at 751-52.
54.

Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363 ("[1I]n the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no

such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
prosecution's offer.").

55.

See Newton, 480 U.S. at 410 (Stevens,

J.,

dissenting) (arguing that a release-dismissal

deal is unconstitutionally coercive because it "has no connection with the give-and-take over the
defendant's wrongdoing that is the essence of the plea-bargaining process, and thus cannot be

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1916

[Vol. gg:1905

imprisonment" standard does not involve a guilty plea or plea bargain of any
type. Third, each type of sentencing differential penalizes a separate and
distinct constitutional right. While plea bargains arguably penalize
invocation of the right to trial, the "actual imprisonment" standard penalizes
the separate right to appointed counsel.
Outside the plea bargain context, the Supreme Court has often found
penalizing a defendant's constitutional right to be unconstitutional.5 6 A
number of such cases involve burdening a defendant's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. For example, in Griffin v. California, the
Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction because the trial court
commented negatively to the jury about the defendant's failure to testify on
his

own behalf.57 In

holding

that the conviction

violated

the Self-

'

Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court explained that
comment on the refusal to testify "is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly."5 8 Similarly, in Mitchell v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the Griffin right to an unburdened Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination equally applies in the sentencing context.59 A
sentencing judge must not draw a negative inference from the defendant's
silence during a sentencing hearing.6 o The Court has also held that it is
impermissible to penalize exercise of the right against self-incrimination by
termination of employment or disbarment. 6
The Supreme Court has also often found sentencing differentials that
penalize a defendant's constitutional or statutory rights to be
unconstitutional. For example, in North Carolina v. Pearce, the Supreme
Court set aside the more harsh punishments imposed on two defendants
following their reconviction after they were granted a new trial.6 2 In ruling
that the increased punishment violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained that it penalized the
defendants for pursuing their statutory right to appeal:

justified by reference to the principles of mutual advantage that support plea bargaining");
Mazzone, supra note 49, at 872 n.333 (noting "that courts and commentators (endorsing plea
bargaining) have often emphasized that a statute providing for a lesser penalty for defendants
who plead guilty may be unconstitutional").
56. Case Notes, supra note 3o, at 73 ("While the Supreme Court has prohibited states
from unduly encouraging defendants to forgo their constitutional rights in other contexts, it
has tolerated plea bargaining." (footnote omitted)).
57.
58.
59.
6o.
61.
385 U.S.
62.

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 6og, 615 (1965).
Id. at 614.
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999).
Id.
See Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (employment); Spevack v. Klein,
511, 516 (1967) (plurality opinion) (disbarment).
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-26 (1969).
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A court is "without right to ... put a price on an appeal. A
defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and
unfettered.... [I] t is unfair to use the great power given to the
court to determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma
of making an unfree choice."6 3
The Court stated that due process requires that a defendant
considering an appeal be free of the fear of a vindictively imposed harsher
sentence upon reconviction because it would "unconstitutionally deter a
defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first
conviction ... "64

For another example of an unconstitutional sentencing differential
outside the plea bargain context, consider United States v. Jackson.6 5 The
defendant was charged under a federal statute that authorized capital
punishment if the defendant opted for a jury trial but only non-capital
punishment if the defendant did not receive a jury trial.66 The district court
found the statute "unconstitutional because it makes 'the risk of death' the
price for asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby 'impairs ... free
exercise' of that constitutional right."67 Agreeing with the district court that
the statute "impose [d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a
constitutional right,"16 the Supreme Court explained that the death penalty
provision's "inevitable effect ... [was], of course, to discourage assertion of
the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 69 While the Court
acknowledged that the legitimacy of the statute's motive or objective was a
factor in determining the constitutionality of its coercive effect, in this case
the Court found that its effect "could not be justified by its ostensible
purpose."70
Jackson's analysis of the legitimacy of the objective is particularly helpful.
Jackson explains that if the statute or practice does not have some "other
purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently
unconstitutional."71 The government, in Jackson, claimed that limiting
capital punishment to jury trials has another, legitimate purpose: "It avoids
the more drastic alternative of mandatory capital punishment in every

Id. at 724 (quoting Worcester v. Comm'r, 37o F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966).
Id. at 72 5
United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Id. at 571.
Id. (quoting United States v.Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn. 1967)).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).

70.

Id. at 582-83.
Id.at 5 81.

71.

.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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case."72 By successfully decreasing the incidence of capital punishment, the
government argued, its "incidental effect" of discouraging the assertion of
the right to ajury trial is irrelevant.73 The Court in Jackson replied that "[t]he
question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than
intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore
excessive."74 The Court decided that the government's goal of limiting
capital punishment to when a jury recommends it can equally be achieved
without penalizing defendants who invoke their right to a jury trial.75
Because of the availability of other alternatives that attain the legitimate goal
without penalizing or chilling constitutional rights, the chilling or coercive
effect is unnecessary. Since it is unnecessary, it is unconstitutional:
"Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by
means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights."7 6

The necessary/unnecessary approach of Jackson has also been affirmed
where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the burdening of a
constitutional right. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the Court distinguished Pearce
and upheld the constitutionality of a higher sentence, when imposed not by
ajudge but by ajury, following reconviction after a new trial was granted.77
In denying the defendant's argument that it penalized his right to appeal
and his right to ajury trial on retrial, the Court explained that the coercive
"effect cannot be said to be 'needless."'7 8 As support for its view that the
coercive effect on defendants was necessary, the Court considered two
alternatives.79 It concluded that "[e]ither alternative would interfere with
concededly legitimate state interests, and thus the burden imposed on the
right to trial by jury is no less necessary."so The Court noted that the Jackson
necessary/unnecessary approach may also explain the constitutionality of
plea-bargaining. 8' While penalization of constitutional rights is "inevitable"
in plea-bargaining,8. plea-bargaining is "an 'essential'

. . .

'component of the

Id. at 581-82.
73. Id. at 582 (citing McDowell v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426,431 (E.D. Tenn. 1967)).
74. Id.
75. Id. ("In some States, for example, the choice between life imprisonment and capital
punishment is left to a jury in every case-regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been
determined.").
76. Id.; see also id. at 583 ("Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that
needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.").
72.

77.
78.

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1973).
Id. at 33-3 4 n.21 (quoting Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583).

79. Id. ("The parameters ofjudge- and jury-sentencing power, given the binding nature of
Pearce, can only be made coterminous by either (s) restricting the jury's power of independent
assessment, or (2) requiring jury sentencing in every felony case irrespective whether guilt is
determined by a bench trial or a guilty plea after reversal of the conviction.").
8o. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.at38 31
82.

Id. at

3 1.
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administration of justice."' 83 Because it is essential, its penalization of
constitutional rights is necessary and thus constitutional underJackson. 84
The necessary/unnecessary distinction of Jackson and Chaffin is also
featured in Howard Abrams' helpful framework.5 His account distinguishes
between three different types of cases in which a statute or State practice
penalizes or chills the assertion of a constitutional or statutory right.88 The
first type, exemplified by Pearce, involves the government's subjective
improper motivation to penalize or chill a defendant's assertion of a right.87
When a court does find improper motivation the outcome is clear: "Any
systemic coercion subjectively intended to discourage the assertion of a
constitutional right is invalid since dissuading the exercise of constitutional
rights is not a permissible goal of legislation."88
Neither Abrams's second nor third type involves subjective improper
motivation.8 9 Both combine a permissible purpose with a coercive effect.9o
Abrams distinguishes the second and third types by the Jackson/Chaffin
criterion-whether the coercive effect is necessary or unnecessary to achieve
the permissible purpose.9' In the third type, exemplified by plea bargaining,
the coercive effect is necessary to achieve the permissible goal.92 In order to
achieve what the Supreme Court has labeled as the "highly desirable" and
"essential" goal of plea bargaining, inducing (by the threat of greater
punishment if the defendant goes to trial) the defendant into waiving the
Sixth Amendment right to trial and pleading guilty is necessary.93
Abrams' second type, exemplified by Jackson, imposes a coercive effect
that is unnecessary to achieve the permissible purpose.94 In Jackson, the
permissible goal of limiting the imposition of capital punishment was
attained by means that penalized and chilled the defendant's exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.95 Because the Court found that the
permissible goal could be achieved through alternate means that avoided

Id. at 31 n.18 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971)).
See id. at 30-31, 33-34 n.21 (drawing the conclusion after examining prior case law).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Abrams, supra note 44, at 143-55.
Id.
Id. at 1 4 3- 4 6.
Id. at 14 4
Id. at 1 4 7.

go.

Id.

91.

See id. at 1 4 7- 5 1.
Id. at 147, 149, 16o-64. For another commentator explaining the Supreme Court's

92.

.

83.
84.

upholding of the constitutionality of plea-bargaining on the basis of necessity, despite its
penalization of constitutional rights, see Mazzone, supra note 49, at 837-38.
93.

Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).

94.
95.

Abrams, supra note 44, at 147-49.
United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968).
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the coercive effect on the defendant, the coercive effect was unnecessary
and thus unconstitutional.9 6
C.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OFScoTT 's "ACTUAL IMPRISONMENT" STANDARD

Because there is little direct authority on burdening the right to
appointed counsel, let us apply the Jackson/Chaffin/Abrams approach to
Scott's "actual imprisonment" standard. This approach is well-suited because
it reconciles some of the Supreme Court's seemingly disparate rulings,
including plea bargaining, and is susceptible to neutral application, having
found some right-burdening practices constitutional and others
unconstitutional.
In applying this approach, the first step is to determine whether the
"actual imprisonment" standard has a legitimate purpose. If it lacks a
legitimate purpose, then, as in Pearce, the coercive effect would be presumed
vindictive or retaliatory and thus unconstitutional.97 But presumably it does
have a legitimate purpose: It ensures that no defendant receives the most
severe punishment authorized for a misdemeanor-imprisonment-without
the safeguard of counsel.
The next step is to determine whether the specific means employed
(and the coercive effect entailed by those means) is necessary or
unnecessary to attain that legitimate purpose. To determine whether it is
necessary or unnecessary, we must consider whether alternate means that
lack a coercive effect could equally attain the legitimate purpose. If there are
no such alternate means, then the coercive effect is necessary and
presumably constitutional. If there is such an alternate means, then the
coercive effect is unnecessary and presumably unconstitutional. Here, there
are two obvious alternatives. First, extend Gideon to all indigent defendants
charged with misdemeanors. Second, extend Gideon to only those indigent
defendants charged with misdemeanors in which imprisonment is
authorized-i.e., the "authorized imprisonment" standard. Either of these
alternatives would equally achieve the goal of ensuring that no indigent
defendant charged with a misdemeanor receives the punishment of
imprisonment without the assistance of counsel. And neither of these
alternatives would coerce an indigent defendant to refrain from requesting,
or penalize for obtaining, the assistance of counsel. As a result, the "actual
imprisonment" standard's penalization of the assistance of counsel and/or
chilling effect on invoking the right to counsel is unnecessary. And because
it is unnecessary, it is presumably unconstitutional.
Perhaps the permissible or legitimate objective or purpose might be
reframed. Rather than ensuring that no defendant receives imprisonment
without the assistance of counsel, it might be recast as providing counsel to
96.

Id. at 582-83.

97.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,

724-25

(1969).
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indigent misdemeanants receiving imprisonment at a reasonable cost,9 by
limiting the right of counsel to those actually imprisoned, the cost would be
reasonable. Are the means to attain this reframed objective necessary? Or
are there alternate means that might equally attain the objective without the
coercive effect?99
Let us consider the two alternate means discussed above that lack the
coercive effect. First, would providing counsel to all indigents equally attain
the objective? Writing in 1972, Justice Powell, in his concurrence in
Argersinger, suggests "no." He stated that "the price of pursuing this easy
course could be high indeed in terms of its adverse impact on the
administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States."-oo Thus, from
this perspective, the alternate means would not attain the objective at a
reasonable cost. But as of 2009, Paul Marcus reports that as many as "fortysix states provide counsel in all, or virtually all, criminal cases."1oI Since they
do so not because of a constitutional obligation, we might infer that these
states are able to provide counsel to indigents in virtually all criminal cases at
a reasonable cost. Thus, even if the "actual imprisonment" standard was
economically necessary in 1972, it is now no longer economically
necessary. o

As to the second possible alternate means discussed above, would
adoption of the "authorized imprisonment" standard equally attain the
objective? Writing in 1979, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion
in Scott, suggests "no." He stated that "any extension [of the right to counsel
beyond the "actual imprisonment" standard]
would.. . impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 5o quite diverse
States."1o3 Thus, from this perspective, the alternate means would not attain
the objective at a reasonable cost. But in a dissenting opinion, Justice

g8.

See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The apparent

reason for the Court's adoption of the 'actual imprisonment' standard for all misdemeanors is
concern for the economic burden that an 'authorized imprisonment' standard might place on the
States."); Marcus, supra note ii, at 163 ("Clearly of great pause for the justices in possibly extending
counsel rights in all criminal cases was the financial impact it would have on the states.").
99.
For discussion of whether financial cost considerations may constitute a permissible or
legitimate objective or purpose, see Abrams, supra note 44, at 148-49. Abrams argues that if
economic considerations are included, Jackson's analysis (that the means used to obtain the
government's goal was unnecessary and thus unconstitutional) may be mistaken. Id. at 148.
"The Court's proposed alternative was considerably more expensive than the voided
alternative." Id. But Abrams argues that "[miore plausibly, the Court might have meant that
administrative efficiency and cost effectiveness should play no role in determining what is
necessary to further state aims . . . ." Id.
oo.

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 50-51 (1972) (Powell,J., concurring).

toi.

Marcus, supra note 11, at 164.
102.
See id. at 164-65 (contending that because almost all states provide counsel in almost
all criminal cases "it is hard to believe that the costs would be so overbearing so as to weigh too
heavily on the constitutional analysis").
103.

Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
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Brennan argued that an "authorized imprisonment" standard would not
impose unreasonable costs on the states. 0 4 In support, he notes that "Scott
would be entitled to appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33
States."os Moreover, as Paul Marcus notes, as of 2009, only "[fjlive states
require a sentence of actual imprisonment for a defendant to be entitled to
court-appointed counsel."o6 Again, this suggests that even if the "actual
imprisonment" standard was economically necessary in 1979, it is now no
longer economically necessary. 07 As a result, there are arguably two
different alternate means that equally attain the legitimate objective and do
so at a reasonable cost. Thus, the means-the "actual imprisonment"
standard-is unnecessary and its coercive effect is unconstitutional even if
the objective is reframed to include financial cost.
Not only is the "actual imprisonment" standard unnecessary to achieve
the reasonable-cost objective, the cost-based objective itself is arguably not
permissible.,o8Justice Brennan argues that Scott's concern with not providing
any more Sixth Amendment right to counsel than states can reasonably
afford is "irrelevant."og Brennan states that the "Court's role in enforcing
constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants cannot be made
dependent on the budgetary decisions of state governments."io Brennan
cites Mayer v. City of Chicago, where the Court "reject[ed] a proposed fiscal
justification for providing free transcripts for appeals only when the
appellant was subject to imprisonment."-'According to Mayer, "'[t]he
invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are
made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in
the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant."'"12 As a result, the cost-based objective may not even be
permissible in the sense that it is "irrelevant." s Thus, reframing the
purpose of the "actual imprisonment" standard to include financial cost
104.
105.

Id. at 385-88 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 388.

Marcus, supra note i i, at 165.
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
io8. See Abrams, supra note 44, at 148 (attributing to the Court in Jackson the view that
"cost considerations are not sufficiently important to justify interference with the exercise of
constitutional rights"); cf id. at 149 (acknowledging difficulties with that view).
Scott, 440 U.S. at 384 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
109.
i1o. Id.
11. Id. (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971)).
112.
Id. (quoting Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197).
113. Note that the conception of impermissible government goal or objective is somewhat
different here than as previously developed. In contrast to the impermissible governmental
objective of affirmatively attempting to penalize or chill the exercise of constitutional or statutory
rights as in Pearce, see text accompanying notes 64-66, here the conception of impermissibility of
the governmental objective emphasizes the irrelevance of the objective. At least with respect to
some rights of a defendant, the cost to the state of implementing that right is irrelevant to its
constitutional scope and/or is insufficient tojustify or outweigh the coercive effect.
1o6.
107.
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does not make the coercive effect necessary (and thus constitutional), and
may even compound its constitutional infirmities.
III. OBJECTIONS

This Part anticipates and attempts to rebut the following three possible
objections. First, as only a conditional right, the Scott right to counsel cannot
be unconstitutionally burdened. Second, because Scott burdens both the
exercise of the right to counsel and the waiver of that right, it is not a
paradigmatic instance of unconstitutionally burdening a right. Third, and
related to the second objection, the burdening of the right cannot arise as a
practical matter.
A.

ONLYA CoNDITIoNAL CONSTITUTiONAL RIGHT

One might object that the Scott right to counsel is not a full
constitutional right but only a conditional constitutional right. It is
conditioned on the indigent defendant being sentenced to a punishment
that includes imprisonment. As only a conditional right, it is a non-existent
right until the condition-a judge imposing a prison sentence-arises. And
as only a conditional right, it may be penalized or chilled without running
afoul of the general constitutional principle that penalizing or chilling a
defendant's right is unconstitutional.
There are a number of responses to this objection. First, if it is a
conditional right that is non-existent until the condition arises (and that
condition arises only after the guilt phase of a trial), what exactly is it that
the indigent defendant is sometimes asked to waive before a trial even
begins?"4 Some courts will ask whether the indigent is waiving, or even
request that the indigent waive, her right to counsel."5 Argersinger and
Shelton both anticipate that some defendants will waive their right to
counsel." 6 But if the right is non-existent at the time of the waiver, as the
objection maintains, how can one waive a non-existent right? Jason
Mazzone's account of waiver suggests that one must actually possess a right
and be able to exercise it in order to waive it: "A person waives a right when
he or she voluntarily relinquishes it. Thus, waiver occurs when a person
possesses a right she could exercise but she purposely decides to relinquish it and
A legally binding waiver of a right is generally defined as the "intentional
114.
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938). Some additional requirements for the waiver to be legally binding are that it
must be "knowing and intelligent," Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), and
"informed and voluntary," United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995).
See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1342 (citing an account of a judge informing the
115.
defendant of the right to counsel, subsequently refusing to appoint counsel, and then

demanding that the defendant waive counsel).
16. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) ("It is thus the controlling rule that
'absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ...

unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.'" (quoting Argersinger 407 U.S. at 37)).
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does not exercise it.""7 Mazzone's account seems to preclude the possibility
of waiving a non-existent right. Because courts ask indigent defendants to
waive their right to counsel, many defendants do waive the right, courts accept
the waiver, and Argersingerand Shelton anticipate that defendants may waive
the right, there is ample support to conclude that the Scott right to counsel is
not merely a conditional right.
Second, even if the right to counsel under Scott is not quite a full
constitutional right, the general principle that penalizing or chilling a right
is unconstitutional may still apply. This general principle does not
necessarily require that the penalized or chilled right be a constitutional
right." 8 For example, consider Pearce, where the defendant received a
greater punishment following reconviction after an appeal. Despite the right
to appeal being a statutory right instead of a constitutional right,"9 the
Court found that penalizing or chilling the non-constitutional right to
appeal was nonetheless unconstitutional. If penalizing or chilling a nonconstitutional right is unconstitutional, then afortioripenalizing or chilling a
not-quite-full constitutional right to counsel may also be unconstitutional.
Third, even if the right to counsel is merely a conditional right, Scott's
"actual imprisonment" standard may still violate broad articulations of the
principle. There is some authority that penalizing or chilling conduct that is
merely "what the law plainly allows" is also unconstitutional.12o The law
plainly allows, in the sense that it does not prohibit, an indigent to request
the assistance of appointed counsel---even if she is not unconditionally
entitled to that right. But the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard,
attaching the prospect of greater punishment for a counseled indigent,
penalizes and chills what the law plainly allows.
B.

LACK OFA TRUE COERCIVE EFFECT

The penalizing and chilling effect of the "actual imprisonment"
standard is curiously unlike the other paradigmatic instances of penalizing
or chilling a constitutional right. In the paradigmatic instances, the burden
on exercising the right creates a chilling effect such that the defendant may
be coerced into foregoing or waiving that right. For example, as discussed
above, to avoid greater punishment following a reconviction, a defendant
may waive the right to appeal. To avoid the prospect of capital punishment,

117. Mazzone, supra note 49, at 804 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
118.
See, e.g., United States v. Falcon, 347 F. 3 d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A vindictive
prosecution claim arises when the government pursues prosecution in retaliation for the
exercise of a protected statutory or constitutional right." (emphasis added)).
11g. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[A]ppellate review is in itself not required by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .").
120. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("To punish a person because he
has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort
. . . ."); see supranote 44 and accompanying text.
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a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial. Even practices upheld as
constitutional satisfy the paradigm. To avoid greater punishment, a
defendant may waive the right to a trial and plead guilty or enter into a plea
bargain. But the "actual imprisonment" standard differs. It penalizes a
defendant for either exercising the right to counsel or waiving the right to
counsel.21 As such, one might object that the "actual imprisonment"
standard does not in some sense truly penalize or chill the enjoyment of the
right to counsel because it equally penalizes and chills the waiver of that

right.
There are a number of responses to this objection. First, that it also
penalizes or chills the waiver of the right to counsel in no way minimizes that
it penalizes and chills the enjoyment of the right to counsel. The defendant
is still eligible for greater punishment if the defendant has the assistance of
counsel. And this prospect of greater punishment penalizes and chills the
enjoyment of the assistance of counsel.
Second, not only does the "actual imprisonment"
standard
simultaneously penalize and chill both the exercise and waiver of the right
to counsel, but it may also exacerbate the coercive effect. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel includes two separate rights for an indigent:
the right to the assistance of appointed counsel and the right to waive the
assistance of counsel.122 By making eligibility for greater punishmentimprisonment-conditional on foregoing exercise of either of the two
separate Sixth Amendment counsel rights, the "actual imprisonment"
standard penalizes and chills both aspects of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. It discourages a defendant from laying any claim to her
Sixth Amendment counsel rights. The penalizing and chilling effect is
thereby greater than if just one right-to the assistance of appointed
counsel-was penalized and chilled.
C.

COERCIVE EFFECT CANNOT ARISE AS A PRACTICAL MA TIER

As discussed above, the only way to avoid eligibility for the greater
punishment of imprisonment is to neither enjoy nor waive counsel. Thus,
for there to be a coercive effect there must be a procedurally cognizable
position in which the defendant neither enjoys nor waives counsel. But
generally, a defendant must either have or waive counsel. Because there
appears to be no middle ground between assistance of counsel and waiver of
counsel, a defendant does not seem to have a procedurally cognizable
position from which she could be coerced into avoiding both. Lacking such

121.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Curiously, Scott, unlike Argersinger and
Shelton, never explicitly states that a defendant is eligible for a punishment of imprisonment if
the right to counsel is waived.
122. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 807 (1975) (holding that a defendant has the
separate right to waive the assistance of counsel and that this right is one aspect of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
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a position, the coercive effect of the "actual imprisonment" standard cannot
arise as a practical matter.
But there is such a middle position. In what might be termed the "don't
tell and hope not to be asked" approach, a defendant neither volunteers
that she is indigent, nor requests counsel, nor formally waives the right to
counsel, and simply hopes the court fails to inquire. If the court does fail to
affirmatively inquire into these matters, the defendant will have neither
waived counsel nor received counsel. And thus such a defendant would
preclude eligibility for the greater type of punishment. However, this
approach would not work in all jurisdictions and with all courts. Those
courts or jurisdictions that either require the defendant to affirmatively
request counsel or require that the court affirmatively inquire into these
matters might preclude this approach. But not all jurisdictions or courts
have such requirements.23 And even in those that do have such formal
requirements, in the chaos and crushing dockets of misdemeanor courts,
such procedural formalities are often not followed.124 For an example we
need look no further than Scott. The defendant was not given "notice of
entitlement to retain counsel or, if indigent, to have counsel provided."'12
Scott neither claimed to be indigent nor was there any determination of
indigency undertaken by the trial court.'1 6 No determination of indigency
occurred until "the time of his initial appeal."'27 For another example,

consider Alabama v. Shelton. While the trial "court repeatedly warned Shelton
[the defendant] about the problems self-representation entailed," the court

123.

See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After

Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2163 (2013) (citing a study of Florida misdemeanor
cases that showed "[slome defendants were not advised of their right to counsel and others
were handed forms encouraging them to waive counsel"); see also id. (noting that numerous
Michigan courts in misdemeanor cases routinely both decline to offer counsel and accept
uninformed (and thus invalid) waivers).
124.
See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 36, at 481 n.92 (citing "evidence that many
misdemeanor defendants are not informed of their right to counsel"); Natapoff, supra note 4, at
1315 ("Massive, underfunded, informal, and careless, the misdemeanor system propels
defendants through in bulk with scant attention to individualized cases and often without
counsel."); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
CriminalCourts, 45 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 277, 312 (201 1) ("Unfortunately, recent studies describe
how some jurisdictions fail-or even purposely refuse-to comply with either the Argersingerline
of cases or their own more rigorous state rule [for appointing counsel].").
125.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 375 (1979) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 375 n.i (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Illinois [appellate] courts and the
parties have assumed his indigency at the time of trial for purposes of this case."); Case Notes,
supra note 3o, at 82 n.9 ("The reviewing courts at all levels assumed Scott to be indigent, even
though he made no such claim at trial.").
127.
Scott, 440 U.S. at 375 n.i (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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neither offered to appoint counsel28 nor ensured that Shelton had legally
waived his right to counsel.

29

As seen in the examples of Scott and Shelton, a defendant may well be in
the "middle position" of being indigent and neither having nor legally
waiving counsel. As a result, the "actual imprisonment" standard does not
merely have a theoretical penalizing or chilling effect. It can, as a practical
matter, actually arise.
CONCLUSION

By attaching the prospect of greater punishment for enjoying the
assistance of appointed counsel, Scott's "actual imprisonment" standard
penalizes an indigent's exercise of the right to counsel and coerces a
defendant into avoiding the assistance of appointed counsel. As a general
principle of constitutional law, such burdening of a constitutional or
statutory right may itself be unconstitutional. Because of the general lack of
consistency in applications of this principle to individual cases, and because
of the lack of specific authority as to the application of this principle to
burdening the right to appointed counsel, it is not entirely clear whether the
penalizing and chilling effect of Scott's "actual imprisonment" standard is
unconstitutional. This Essay argues, however, that the Scott "actual
imprisonment" standard is plausibly unconstitutional.

128.

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).

On Shelton's appeal of his conviction and suspended sentence on Sixth Amendment
12g.
grounds, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals "initially held that an indigent defendant who
receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and
remanded for a determination whether Shelton had" waived his right. Id. at 658-59. On
remand, the trial court determined that Shelton had not effected a legal waiver of his right to
counsel. Shelton v. State, 851 SO.2d 83, 90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
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